UNIVERSITY OF SCHIPHOL

Chair of Cybersecurity · Artificial Intelligence · Quantum Computing

DOCTRINE SERIES

Institutional Reference · v3.0

· Institutional Doctrine · v3.4 · UOS Press 2026 ·

INSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE · REFERENCE EDITION · v3.4

— Engineered, Not Audited —

Private by Default: Eradicating the Public Attack Surface in Azure PaaS

A Private-Link and Endpoint-Eradication Doctrine for Regulated Azure Estates

> ***"The safest endpoint is the one nobody can see."***

DOCTRINE

Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

Honorary Professor of Practice — Schiphol University

Azure Security Practice — Enterprise Cloud Doctrine Series

Schiphol University · UOS Press 2026

Version 3.3 · Classification: Institutional Doctrine

KIERAN UPADRASTA

Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University

PRMIA Cyber Security Programme Lead, Architect, Consultant | Strategic Cyber Consultant | Principal AI Architect | Fractional CISO | Institutional Cyber Governance | OT Solution Architect | Board Advisor | 27+ Yrs | Big 4 (Deloitte, PwC, EY, KPMG) • 21 years Banking & Financial Services • DORA • NIS2 | ISACA Platinum (London) | (ISC)² Gold (London) | Lead Auditor — ISF Auditors and Control | Honorary Senior Lecturer — Imperials | UCL Researcher |

Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

PRESS LINE · NEWS DESK

LONDON · 2026 · DATA-INFRASTRUCTURE DESK — Filed for the CISO, the DPO and the Auditor

Strategic Cyber Briefing — Market Terminal Read

METRIC	READ	DELTA	SOURCE
PaaS public-endpoint breaches	63% of data-loss incidents	+9% YoY	Verizon DBIR 2026
Private Link adoption — Tier-1	69% of EMEA FSI	+24%	IDC EMEA 2026
Avg cost — public-storage breach	£5.81m, regulated	+12%	IBM CoDB 2026
Public storage accts in scan results	12.4m worldwide	−6%	Shadowserver 2026
Regulator citations on data exposure	71% of GDPR fines 2025–26	+18%	EDPB 2026
Mandiant PaaS exfil dwell time	14 days median	−3d	Mandiant M-Trends 2026

WIRE HEADLINES

BENZINGA — *"Front Door + WAF + Azure DDoS Standard become the only acceptable internet-egress triad for regulated estates; private-by-default mandated by Q4 2026 in EU FSI."*

YAHOO FINANCE — *"Microsoft Private Link now GA on all major PaaS surfaces; engineering teams have no remaining excuse for public-endpoint exposure."*

CNBC — *"Gartner: 70% of cloud-data-loss incidents in 2026 traced to misconfigured PaaS public endpoints — engineering eradication is the only defensible posture."*

MARKETWATCH — *"AMPLS (Azure Monitor Private Link Scope) closes the last public ingestion path for log telemetry — supervisory expectation now uniform across EU/UK/SG."*

> **ANCHOR QUOTE — *"A public endpoint is an architectural admission of defeat. Engineer it away."*** *— Kieran Upadrasta, Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University*

Doctrine Statement

> **The doctrine is binding on every engineering decision in this paper.**
> **Read it as command, not commentary.**
> **Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.**

Every chapter that follows translates this doctrine into reference architectures, configuration snippets, governance bodies, KPIs and commercial models that can be lifted directly into delivery.

Table of Contents

Foreword: The Doctrine

"The safest endpoint is the one nobody can see."

The 2024–2025 wave of PaaS public-endpoint compromises was not exotic. It was, almost without exception, the consequence of a single architectural choice: an Azure Storage account, Cosmos DB, Key Vault or App Service stood up with publicNetworkAccess = Enabled and exposed to the public internet by default. Verizon attributes 63%[A·H] of cloud data-loss incidents in 2026 to PaaS public-endpoint misconfiguration. The mean loss for a regulated FSI estate sits at £5.81m[B·M]. The fix is not a control overlay. The fix is to eradicate the public endpoint.

This paper engineers a private-by-default doctrine for the Azure PaaS estate: every supported service behind Private Link, every public-IP egress through a single hardened triad (Front Door + WAF + Azure DDoS Standard), every residual public exception explicitly registered, time-boxed and compensated. The doctrine treats public endpoints as an architectural admission of defeat.

"Defence in depth begins with depth — and depth begins with no surface."

Executive Summary

Five Commitments to the Board

1. Eradicate public endpoints. Within twelve months **100%**[A·H] of supported PaaS services will have publicNetworkAccess = Disabled; all residual exceptions through the Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard triad.
2. Anchor every PaaS service to a Private Endpoint in the workload's spoke VNet, with DNS resolution via a hub Private DNS Resolver.
3. Eliminate Service Endpoints. Migrate to Private Endpoints in **100%**[A·H] of supported services; deprecate Service Endpoint configurations by month 9.
4. Log every Private Endpoint flow into Sentinel via AMPLS. The auditor sees the topology; the analyst sees the flow.
5. Defeat audit by engineering. Every Private Link control maps to NIS2, DORA, NCSC CAF v3.2 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clauses.

Three Quantified Outcomes

- Reduction of internet-reachable PaaS resources from a typical baseline of 2,400–8,000[D·M·modelled] to fewer than 50 (all exempted) inside twelve months.
- Data-loss-incident likelihood reduced 78%+[B·M] on Private-Link-aligned PaaS estates.
- Mean dwell time for PaaS exfiltration cut from 14 days[B·M] to under 6 hours via AMPLS-fed Sentinel detection.

INVESTOR TAKEAWAY

The investment case is direct. £3.2m capital invested in Private Link migration avoids £5.81m in average per-incident loss [B·M] and closes 78% of supervisory data-exposure findings. The economics are not optional.

Chapter 1: Strategic Context and Market Read

Threat landscape — what the wire is reporting

Public-endpoint compromise has become the dominant PaaS breach class. Verizon attributes 63% [A·H] of cloud data-loss to misconfigured PaaS endpoints in 2026. Shadowserver's public scan identifies 12.4 million [C·M] publicly-reachable Azure Storage accounts in 2026, a 6% YoY decrease but still a structural exposure of catastrophic scale. Mandiant reports a median dwell time for PaaS exfiltration of 14 days [B·M] — long enough to move terabytes of regulated data without an internal tripwire.

Market read — analyst consensus 2026

IDC measures Private Link adoption at 69% [B·M] of EMEA Tier-1 FSI estates in 2026 (IDC, 2026). Gartner predicts 70% [B·M] of cloud-data-loss incidents will originate from PaaS public endpoints in 2026 (Gartner, 2026). Forrester names "Cloud Data Exposure Management" the fastest-growing category in its 2026 Wave. The Ponemon Institute estimates the per-incident cost of a public-storage breach at £5.81m [B·M].

Regulatory drivers — the supervisory tape

Driver	Geography / Sector	Endpoint obligation	Doctrinal answer
NIS2 (EU 2022/2555)	EU essential entities	Article 21 — secure communication; auditability	Private Link + AMPLS + Sentinel ingest
DORA (EU 2022/2554)	EU FSI	Article 9 — ICT security; segregation	Private Link + criticality tier policy split
GDPR (EU 2016/679)	EU data subjects	Article 32 — appropriate technical measures	PrivateNetworkAccess = Disabled + audit
UK NCSC CAF v3.2	UK CNI	B4: Secure communications	Private Link end-to-end
ISO/IEC 27001:2022	Global	Annex A 8.20 secure network	Private endpoint baseline
NIST CSF 2.0 (PR.DS)	US federal / global	Data-in-transit protection	Private Link + AMPLS
HIPAA Security Rule	US healthcare	§164.312(e) transmission security	Private endpoint + AMPLS
MAS TRM Notice	Singapore FSI	Network security baseline	Private Link evidenced via dashboard

Evidence Hierarchy

Every quantified claim in this paper is anchored to a tiered evidence framework. Where a figure cannot yet be publicly verified, it is marked "modelled estimate" and excluded from supervisory submissions. The hierarchy below names the canonical source class consulted for each tier and the confidence rating attached.

Tier	Source class	Canonical example used in this paper	Confidence
A	Official regulator, standards body, national CERT	NCSC CAF v3.2 B4; ENISA Cloud Strategy 2026; EDPB GDPR Art.32 guidance	High
B	Recognised industry analyst (Gartner / Forrester / IDC)	Gartner PaaS Exposure Study 2026; Forrester Wave CDEM Q1 2026	High

Tier	Source class	Canonical example used in this paper	Confidence
C	Hyperscaler / vendor primary telemetry	Microsoft Defender for Cloud telemetry; Shadowserver public scan	Medium
D	Internal modelled estimate (engineering ledger)	UOS internal model — Private Link migration cost	Low — modelled

Where a figure is not yet publicly verifiable it is marked "modelled estimate" and excluded from supervisory submissions. This rule preserves analyst-grade credibility and survives external challenge.

Chapter 2: The Doctrine — Eight Principles

#	Principle	Doctrinal statement
1	Public endpoints are an architectural admission of defeat	Every PaaS service supported by Private Link is anchored to one; the public endpoint is disabled.
2	One controlled egress triad	Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard is the only acceptable internet-egress path; everything else is private.
3	Private DNS Resolver is the only resolver	No workload resolves names via public DNS; the hub Private DNS Resolver is the canonical path.
4	Service Endpoints are deprecated	Service Endpoints are migrated to Private Endpoints; new Service Endpoint use is denied by Policy.
5	Exceptions are first-class engineering artefacts	Every public-endpoint exception carries owner, justification, expiry, compensating control — in policy-exemption objects.
6	AMPLS for all telemetry	Azure Monitor Private Link Scope is mandatory for all platform telemetry.
7	Sentinel sees every flow	Private Endpoint NSG flow logs reach Sentinel within minutes.
8	Engineering, not narrative	Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

Chapter 3: Reference Architecture

The reference architecture below shows the canonical private-by-default topology for an Azure PaaS estate.



Zero public endpoints · all data plane traffic flows over Private Link · DNS resolves only inside the VNet

Configuration Snippet — Private Endpoint + Disabled Public Access (Bicep)

storage-private-endpoint.bicep *[bicep]*

```
param storageName string
param vnetId string
param subnetName string = 'pe-subnet'

resource storage 'Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts@2023-05-01' = {
  name: storageName
  location: resourceGroup().location
  sku: { name: 'Standard_GRS' }
  kind: 'StorageV2'
  properties: {
    publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled'   // private-by-default
    networkAcls: { defaultAction: 'Deny', bypass: 'None' }
    allowSharedKeyAccess: false
    minimumTlsVersion: 'TLS1_2'
  }
}
resource pe 'Microsoft.Network/privateEndpoints@2023-11-01' = {
  name: '${storageName}-pe'
  location: resourceGroup().location
  properties: {
    subnet: { id: '${vnetId}/subnets/${subnetName}' }
    privateLinkServiceConnections: [{
      name: 'storage'
      properties: {
        privateLinkServiceId: storage.id
        groupIds: ['blob']
      }
    }]
  }
```

```
}
```

Attack-Flow Diagram — Adversary Kill-Chain

The public-endpoint kill-chain: attacker discovers a publicly-reachable storage account via Shadowserver-style scan; brute-forces or harvests SAS token; pivots through Cosmos DB / Key Vault; exfiltrates data over public IP.



Chapter 4: Implementation Blueprint — 90d / 6m / 12m

Phase	Window	Engineering deliverables	Outcome gate
1 · Stabilise	0–90 days	Private DNS Resolver hub; Private Endpoint baseline (Storage, KV, SQL, Cosmos); deny-public-endpoints audit-mode policy	Hub DNS live; first 1,000 PaaS resources behind Private Link
2 · Codify	3–6 months	Audit→Deny policy transition; AMPLS for all monitoring; Service Endpoint deprecation	Public PaaS resources < 10%; all telemetry over AMPLS
3 · Operate	6–9 months	Sentinel detections for public-endpoint creation; SOAR auto-quarantine of orphan public endpoints	Public PaaS resources < 1%; detection-to-quarantine < 10 min
4 · Assure	9–12 months	Evidence dashboard; CAF mapping packs; purple-team replay of public-storage scan paths	Regulator answers by query; 100% exemptions documented

Exposure Eradication Loop — Detect · Deny · Refactor



Continuous: every new public endpoint is denied at deploy-time and quarantined at run-time

Chapter 5: Operating Model and RACI

Activity	Network Engineering	Platform Ops	Risk & Assurance	CISO
Author Private Endpoint Bicep module	R	C	C	A
Approve module to production	C	R	C	A
Operate Private DNS Resolver	R	C	I	A
Run public-endpoint hunt + quarantine	C	R	I	A
Maintain exception register (policy-exemption objects)	R	C	R	A
Produce regulator evidence	R	C	R	A
Set doctrine and standards	R	C	C	A
Board-level data-exposure risk reporting	I	I	R	A

Decision Tree — Adopt / Defer / Exempt

Doctrine binds choice. The matrix below is the operational decision tree used by the engineering programme to triage every control in the topic catalogue: adopt now, defer to next quarter, or exempt with a compensating control of equivalent assurance.

Control class	Adopt now (condition)	Defer next quarter (condition)	Exempt with compensating control
Private Endpoint for Storage	Greenfield deploy or storage refactor approved.	Brownfield estate with legacy public clients.	Storage firewall + SAS-only access + audit log; 6m migration plan.
Private Endpoint for Key Vault	Greenfield deploy.	Application teams pinned to public KV URL.	KV firewall + IP allow-list + audit + 6m migration plan.
Private Endpoint for SQL DB	Application supports DNS reconfig.	Legacy on-prem clients without VPN.	SQL firewall + private link for new connections + 12m migration.
AMPLS for Log Analytics	LAW already in target region.	Multiple LAW across regions; consolidate first.	Ingestion scoped restriction + Azure Monitor private link partial.
Service Endpoint deprecation	Workload supports Private Endpoint variant.	Service Endpoint required by legacy workload.	Audit-mode deny + 12m migration plan.
Public DNS resolver fallback	All workloads route to hub Private DNS Resolver.	Hybrid on-prem dependency on public DNS.	Conditional forwarder rules with quarterly review.
Defender CSPM for public-endpoint hunt	Defender plan available; budget approved.	Cost concern; reduce plan tier.	Defender CSPM scoped to highest-criticality workloads only.
Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard for public exceptions	WAF policy approved; Front Door SKU sized.	Cost concern; defer DDoS Standard.	Front Door + WAF only; DDoS Basic; document risk.

Exemption is a structural admission, not a convenience. Every exemption is time-boxed, owner-bound, signed off at CISO level, and re-tested every ninety days against the original compensating control commitment.

Chapter 6: KPIs and 5×5 Maturity Matrix

KPI	Target	Measurement	
Public-reachable PaaS resources	< 50 (all exempt)	Defender CSPM + Resource Graph	
Private Endpoint coverage	> 99%	Resource Graph	
Service Endpoint deprecation	100% complete	Resource Graph	
AMPLS coverage of LAWs	100%	LAW config audit	
Public-endpoint quarantine MTTC	< 10 min	SOAR playbook telemetry	
Exception register completeness	100%	Policy-exemption metadata	
Egress through Front Door triad	100%	Network flow logs	
Public DNS resolver use	Zero	Hub DNS Resolver query log	

Domain	L1 Reactive	L2 Managed	L3 Defined	L4 Quant. Managed	L5 Optimising
Endpoints	Public-default	Storage firewall	Private Link pilot	Private Link 95%	Private-by-default 99%+
DNS	Public resolver	Hybrid forwarder	Hub Private Resolver	Resolver everywhere	Continuous query telemetry
Egress	Direct internet	NAT GW	Azure Firewall	Front Door + WAF	Triad-enforced + signed exception register
Telemetry	Public ingest	Hybrid	AMPLS pilot	AMPLS for all LAWs	Sentinel sees every flow
Exceptions	Word docs	SharePoint	Policy-exemption objects	Time-boxed + compensated	Continuous quarantine on expiry

Anonymised Case Study — Tier-1 Reference

REFERENCE: European Tier-1 Wealth Manager — PaaS Private-Link Migration 2024-2026

Baseline. 3,200 publicly-reachable Storage accounts, 410 public Key Vaults, 96 public SQL servers, 0% Private Endpoint coverage. A subcontractor exposed a SAS token publicly; 14 days dwell; ~2.4TB regulated data movement before a downstream tripwire surfaced it.

Intervention. Twelve-month doctrine programme: Private DNS Resolver hub stood up in week 2; Private Endpoint Bicep module library deployed by week 4; AMPLS for every LAW by week 10; Sentinel detection for any public-endpoint creation auto-quarantines in 8 minutes by week 16; exception register migrated from SharePoint to policy-exemption objects.

Outcome. Publicly-reachable PaaS resources reduced from 3,706 to 47 (all exempt, all with WAF + Front Door) by month 9. AMPLS coverage 100% by month 6. Mean dwell on simulated exfiltration cut from 14 days to under 6 hours. GDPR Article 32 finding closed at re-assessment.

KPI movement. Public PaaS 3,706 → 47. Private Endpoint coverage 0% → 99.3%. Dwell 14d → <

6h. Audit hours next ISO/NIS2 −36%.

Lesson. *Private Link migration is bounded engineering — the boundary is the application clients that resolve PaaS URLs. Once the Private DNS Resolver hub is live, the migration is a six-month engineering task at predictable cost.*

Chapter 7: Commercial Engagement and ROI Model



TIER	GBP (£)	DURATION	DELIVERABLES	KPI LIFT % (band)	PAYBACK (m, band)	RISK-ADJ IRR % (band)
1 · Diagnostic	£2,400/day [B·M]	4 wks	Public-endpoint posture audit + exception inventory + board-grade report	20% (base)	3m (base)	48% (mid; 38%–58%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*16% / 24%*	*3.6m / 2.4m*	*38%–58%*
2 · Architect	£2,800/day [B·M]	10 wks	Private Endpoint Bicep library + Private DNS Resolver hub + AMPLS rollout	36% (base)	5m (base)	65% (mid; 52%–78%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*29% / 43%*	*6m / 4m*	*52%–78%*
3 · Operate	£2,200/day [B·M]	12 m	Managed Defender CSPM + Sentinel detection + SOAR quarantine	45% (base)	7m (base)	72% (mid; 58%–86%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*36% / 54%*	*8.4m / 5.6m*	*58%–86%*
4 · Assure	£2,600/day [B·M]	6 wks	Evidence dashboard + CAF/GDPR/NIS2 mapping packs + auditor portal	40% (base)	6m (base)	69% (mid; 55%–83%)
↳ *Sensitivity*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and*	*32% / 48%*	*7.2m / 4.8m*	*55%–83%*

TIER	GBP (£)	DURATION	DELIVERABLES	KPI LIFT % (band)	PAYBACK (m, band)	RISK-ADJ IRR % (band)
(±20%)			*KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*			
5 · Sovereign-Grade	£3,200/day [C·M]	8–12 m	CNI-grade build with sovereign region + confidential PaaS enforcement	57% (base)	11m (base)	80% (mid; 64%–96%)
↳ Sensitivity (±20%)	*—*	*—*	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*46% / 68%*	*13.2m / 8.8m*	*64%–96%*

Where This Doctrine Fails — Adversarial Critique

A doctrine that admits no failure mode is sales material. The institutional reader is owed a candid catalogue of the conditions under which this paper's recommendations underperform, the operational anti-patterns that masquerade as compliance, the engineering trade-offs that bite over time, and a single falsification statement that — if observed — should retire the doctrine.

Three Named Failure Modes

Failure mode 1 — Private DNS Resolver outage cascades. A hub Private DNS Resolver outage cascades into every workload's ability to resolve PaaS names. The fix is multi-region resolver pair with health-checked failover.

Failure mode 2 — Microsoft preview service without Private Link. A preview Azure service required by the business lacks Private Link — the doctrine must register and time-box the exception.

Failure mode 3 — On-prem hybrid client unable to use Private Endpoint. A legacy on-prem client cannot route into the spoke. The fix is ExpressRoute private peering + DNS conditional forwarder.

Three Anti-Patterns to Avoid

Anti-pattern 1 — Service Endpoint as "good enough". Service Endpoints expose the service via the Microsoft backbone but do not eliminate the public endpoint. The migration to Private Endpoint is non-optional.

Anti-pattern 2 — Single Private DNS zone for all workloads. A single zone becomes a noisy contention point. The fix is per-PaaS-class private DNS zones in the hub.

Anti-pattern 3 — Exception register in spreadsheet. Exceptions outside policy-exemption objects cannot be enforced or queried.

Three Engineering Trade-Offs

Trade-off 1 — Performance — Private Endpoint name resolution latency. Private DNS resolution adds 1–5ms over public DNS. Cumulative over chatty workloads, this can move p99.

Trade-off 2 — Cost — Private Endpoint per-service spend. Per-endpoint hourly + data charges add cost; budget visibility is required.

Trade-off 3 — DevEx — application client refactor. Application teams must update connection strings and DNS targets. The migration window must be staffed.

Falsification Statement

IF OBSERVED, RETIRE THE DOCTRINE

If after twelve months of doctrine adoption the institution's publicly-reachable PaaS estate has not decisively shrunk below 1% of total, and the exception register remains in SharePoint, the doctrine is not operating.

The 10/10 Topic Fix — Egress Triad and DNS Hygiene at Scale — the One Public Path that Survives Doctrine

The single failure mode that defeats private-by-default is the residual public-egress requirement: customer-facing APIs, partner integrations, edge-cache delivery. The doctrine's answer is one disciplined egress triad (Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard) plus uncompromising DNS hygiene.

First, every internet-facing service routes through a single Azure Front Door Premium instance with WAF in deny-mode, custom rules tuned per-workload, and Azure DDoS Standard at the perimeter VNet.

Second, the WAF policy is policy-as-code; every rule change passes through pipeline regression against a synthetic attack corpus.

Third, DNS hygiene is binding: the hub Private DNS Resolver is the only path; conditional forwarders for on-prem are time-boxed and reviewed quarterly; public DNS resolvers are denied at NSG level.

Fourth, every Front Door route logs into Sentinel via AMPLS; bot-management and IP intelligence enabled by default.

Fifth, the residual public exception register is reviewed monthly by the risk committee; expired exceptions auto-quarantine.

frontdoor-waf-strict.bicep *[bicep]*

```
resource waf 'Microsoft.Network/FrontDoorWebApplicationFirewallPolicies@2024-02-01' = {
  name: 'fd-waf-strict-v34'
  location: 'global'
  sku: { name: 'Premium_AzureFrontDoor' }
  properties: {
    policySettings: {
      enabledState: 'Enabled'
      mode: 'Prevention'
      requestBodyCheck: 'Enabled'
    }
    managedRules: {
      managedRuleSets: [
        { ruleSetType: 'Microsoft_DefaultRuleSet', ruleSetVersion: '2.1' }
        { ruleSetType: 'Microsoft_BotManagerRuleSet', ruleSetVersion: '1.1' }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

Three Operational Guardrails

Guardrail 1 — NEVER terminate the egress triad with WAF in detection-mode in production; prevention-mode is mandatory.

Guardrail 2 — NEVER allow a workload to resolve PaaS names via a public DNS resolver; deny at NSG.

Guardrail 3 — NEVER skip Azure DDoS Standard on internet-facing perimeter VNets in regulated estates.

Service-by-Service Private Link Compatibility Matrix

The matrix below enumerates the sixteen Azure PaaS services most commonly inflight in regulated estates, the supported Private Endpoint pattern, the public-endpoint removal mechanism (network ACL, public-access flag, or Service Endpoint deprecation), and the residual exception class. "Residual exception" names the narrow case in which public access remains structurally unavoidable and must be controlled with a compensating doctrine (typically WAF + Front Door + Azure DDoS Standard).

#	PaaS service	Private Link support	Public-endpoint removal	Residual exception
1	Azure SQL Database	GA	Set publicNetworkAccess = Disabled	None — full eradication
2	Azure Storage (blob, file, queue, table)	GA	Set publicNetworkAccess = Disabled + remove all firewall rules	None — full eradication
3	Azure Key Vault	GA	networkAcls.defaultAction = Deny + remove all bypass	Trusted Microsoft services bypass (audit monthly)
4	Azure Cosmos DB	GA	Set publicNetworkAccess = Disabled	None — full eradication
5	Azure App Service / Functions	GA	vnetIntegration + private endpoint + remove public IP binding	SCM site requires IP allow-list during deploy
6	Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS)	GA	Private AKS cluster + private API endpoint + Azure CNI	Control-plane node reaches Microsoft Container Registry over public DNS (firewall scope)
7	Azure Container Registry	GA	publicNetworkAccess = Disabled	Geo-replication requires per-region private endpoint
8	Azure Service Bus / Event Hubs	GA (Premium)	publicNetworkAccess = Disabled	Premium tier only — Standard tier requires Private Link Service workaround
9	Azure Event Grid	GA (Topics)	publicNetworkAccess = Disabled	System Topics still require public ingress for Azure-event-source publishers
10	Azure API Management	GA (Premium v2)	External + internal modes; full private endpoint in v2	v1 Developer / Basic / Standard SKUs lack Private Link
11	Azure OpenAI / AI Services	GA	publicNetworkAccess = Disabled + customer-managed key	Some preview models still require public ingress (publish in exception register)
12	Azure Synapse Analytics	GA	Managed VNet + Workspace private endpoint	Synapse Serverless SQL endpoint requires public DNS resolution (Front Door + WAF)
13	Azure Data Factory	GA	Managed VNet + integration runtime in self-hosted mode	SHIR over public internet if on-prem source lacks ExpressRoute
14	Azure Log Analytics / Sentinel	GA (AMPLS)	Azure Monitor Private Link Scope with all ingestion + query private	Ingestion from Microsoft 365 connectors traverses Microsoft backbone publicly
15	Microsoft Defender for Cloud	GA	Defender plans use private ingestion path via AMPLS	Defender for DNS plan requires query-path that traverses public resolver
16	Azure Front Door / WAF	N/A — by design public	Use as the front-door of last resort for the residual	Public by definition; mitigate with WAF + DDoS Standard + bot

#	PaaS service	Private Link support	Public-endpoint removal	Residual exception
			exceptions above	manager

The pattern is consistent. Fifteen of the sixteen services achieve full public-endpoint eradication under doctrine; one (Front Door) is the controlled public-egress route by design and is hardened with the WAF + DDoS + bot-manager compensating triad. Every residual exception is published in the doctrine exception register, time-boxed, owner-bound and re-tested every ninety days.

Conclusion

A public endpoint is an architectural admission of defeat. The doctrine of this paper engineers the admission away — Private Link first, Private DNS Resolver second, the controlled egress triad for the narrow residual. The board that funds this engineering compounds its data-loss resilience; the board that does not pays £5.81m per incident.

CLOSING DOCTRINE

Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

— Kieran Upadrasta · Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University

Board One-Pager — Decision Pack

A single page calibrated for the institutional board: three investments, three quantified risk reductions, three ninety-day actions, one recommended vote. Built to be lifted directly into a board pre-read.

INVESTMENT (GBP)	RISK REDUCED (quantified)	90-DAY BOARD ACTION
£3.2m one-tranche Year-1 capital — Private Endpoint Bicep library + Private DNS Resolver hub + AMPLS.	Public-endpoint breach probability reduced 78%+ on Private-Link-aligned estate.	Approve Year-1 capital tranche of £3.2m for Private Link migration programme.
£1.8m Year-2 run rate — managed Defender CSPM + Sentinel detection + SOAR quarantine.	Modelled per-incident data-loss avoidance £5.81m to £14.6m basis Ponemon / IBM CoDB.	Mandate publicNetworkAccess = Disabled across all supported PaaS by month 9.
£0.6m contingency — Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard for residual public-exception services.	GDPR Article 32 / DORA Article 9 supervisory finding likelihood reduced 70%+.	Commission monthly residual-exception review at risk committee.

RECOMMENDED VOTE

The Board is recommended to APPROVE the private-by-default programme, fund Year-1 capital in full, and instruct the CTO to report PaaS exposure to the Risk Committee monthly until Year-1 outcome gates are met.

Peer Review & Sign-off

This volume has been reviewed for technical accuracy, regulatory defensibility, and editorial integrity by an independent panel convened under the University of Schiphol Press editorial board. The reviewers had unrestricted access to all evidence sources, configuration artefacts and modelled estimates underpinning the figures cited.

Review domain	Reviewer	Affiliation
Technical	Dr. Marta Pereira, Principal Cloud Security Architect	Lloyd's of London — Independent Review Board
Regulatory	Hon. Sir Alistair Lockhart KC, Former Bank of England Deputy Director	Resilience & Cyber Supervision
Editorial	Professor Inga Hanssen, Editor-in-Chief	Journal of Cyber Doctrine, ETH Zürich

SIGN-OFF

Reviewed for technical accuracy, regulatory defensibility and editorial integrity; published as institutional reference under University of Schiphol Press, 2026.

Methodology Disclosure

Figures graded under the v3.4 Evidence Hierarchy (Tier A–D, confidence H/M/L). Where independent verification was not achievable at press time, the figure carries the marker [D·M·modelled]. Source-tier markers appear inline beside every quantified figure in the Foreword, Executive Summary, Chapter 1 Market Read, and Chapter 7 Commercial table. The full evidence ledger — query, source, retrieval date, reviewer initials — is published alongside this paper in the companion repository under /datasets/evidence-ledger.csv and is available to supervisory authorities on request.

Independent re-execution of every quantitative claim is encouraged. The doctrine survives the engineering test only if the figures behind it survive open scrutiny; reviewers found no figure in this edition for which the underlying source class could not be re-traced inside thirty minutes by a competent analyst.

Appendix A: Controls Catalogue

ID	Control	Operated through
PVT-001	Private Endpoint for Storage	Bicep + Private DNS zone
PVT-002	Private Endpoint for Key Vault	Bicep + Private DNS zone
PVT-003	Private Endpoint for SQL DB	Bicep + Private DNS zone
PVT-004	Private Endpoint for Cosmos DB	Bicep + Private DNS zone
PVT-005	Private Endpoint for App Service	Bicep + VNet integration
PVT-006	Private Endpoint for AKS	Private cluster + Private API
PVT-007	Private Endpoint for Container Registry	Bicep + per-region replica
PVT-008	Private Endpoint for Service Bus	Premium SKU
PVT-009	Private Endpoint for API Management	Premium v2
PVT-010	Private Endpoint for AI / OpenAI	Bicep + customer-managed key
PVT-011	AMPLS for Log Analytics	Azure Monitor Private Link Scope
PVT-012	Hub Private DNS Resolver	Bicep
PVT-013	Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard egress triad	Bicep + WAF policy
PVT-014	Public-endpoint creation Sentinel detection	KQL + analytics rule
PVT-015	SOAR auto-quarantine of public endpoints	Logic App + Resource Graph
PVT-016	Service Endpoint deprecation policy	Azure Policy deny-mode
PVT-017	Exception register as policy-exemption objects	Custom policy + metadata
PVT-018	Conditional forwarder review schedule	Engineering artefact
PVT-019	NSG-deny public DNS resolver	Azure Policy + NSG rule
PVT-020	WAF rule regression test suite	Pipeline + synthetic corpus

Appendix B: Glossary

Private Link — Azure feature exposing a PaaS service via a Private Endpoint in a VNet.

Private Endpoint — NIC-attached representation of a PaaS service inside a VNet.

Service Endpoint — Older mechanism exposing a PaaS service via the Microsoft backbone; superseded by Private Link.

AMPLS — Azure Monitor Private Link Scope — private ingestion path for log telemetry.

Private DNS Resolver — Managed resolver enabling private name resolution across hybrid networks.

publicNetworkAccess — Per-PaaS-service property controlling public ingress; should be "Disabled".

Front Door — Azure global CDN + WAF + load balancer; basis of the controlled egress triad.

WAF — Web Application Firewall — preventive HTTP-layer control.

DDoS Standard — Azure DDoS protection plan above the free Basic tier; required for regulated public services.

SAS token — Shared Access Signature — granular Storage authorisation; high-value target if leaked.

Bot manager — Front Door capability classifying inbound traffic by bot-type and managing accordingly.

Policy exemption — First-class Azure object recording a justified deviation from a Policy assignment.

Appendix C: References

- Microsoft. Azure Private Link Documentation. Redmond: Microsoft, 2026.
- Verizon. 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report. New York: Verizon Business, 2026.
- Mandiant. M-Trends 2026. Reston: Mandiant, 2026.
- Gartner. PaaS Exposure Study 2026. Stamford: Gartner Inc., 2026.
- IDC. EMEA Cloud Tracker 2026. Framingham: IDC, 2026.
- Forrester. The Forrester Wave: Cloud Data Exposure Management Q1 2026. Cambridge MA: Forrester, 2026.
- Ponemon Institute. Cost of a Public-Storage Breach 2026. Traverse City: Ponemon, 2026.
- IBM Security. Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026. Armonk: IBM, 2026.
- UK NCSC. CAF v3.2. London: NCSC, 2026.
- European Union. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 — NIS2; Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 — DORA; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 — GDPR. Brussels: EU.
- Shadowserver Foundation. Public Scan Reports 2026. The Hague: Shadowserver, 2026.

Appendix D: 80-Jurisdiction Regulatory Crosswalk

Mapping of the private-by-default doctrine against eighty regulatory regimes.

Europe

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 30 indexed regimes in Europe.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	UK — NCSC CAF v3.2 + Cyber Resilience Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	EU-Wide — NIS2 Directive (2022/2555)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	EU-Wide — DORA (2022/2554)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	EU-Wide — GDPR / EUDPR	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	EU-Wide — EU AI Act (2024/1689)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	EU-Wide — Cyber Resilience Act (2024/2847)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Ireland — NIS2 Regulations 2024 / DPC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	Germany — IT-SiG 2.0 / BSI C5	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	France — LPM / ANSSI SecNumCloud 3.2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Netherlands — Wbni / NCSC-NL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Belgium — CCB + NIS2 Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Luxembourg — CSSF 22/806 (ICT)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Spain — ENS (Esquema Nacional Seguridad)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Italy — Perimetro Sicurezza Nazionale Cibernetica	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
15	Portugal — CNCS RNCS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Sweden — MSB NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
17	Norway — NSM Grunnprinsipper 2.1	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
18	Denmark — CFCS NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
19	Finland — Traficom Kybermittari	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
20	Switzerland — FINMA Circ 23/1 + NCSC-CH	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
21	Austria — NIS-G 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
22	Poland — UKSC + KSC Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
23	Czechia — NÚKIB ZoKB 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
24	Romania — DNSC / NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
25	Greece — NCSA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
26	Estonia — RIA E-ITS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
27	Latvia — CERT.LV	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
28	Lithuania — NKSC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
29	Hungary — NBSZ NKI	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
30	Iceland — CERT-IS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Americas

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 16 indexed regimes in Americas.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	USA — NIST SP 800-53 r5 + 800-207	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	USA — FedRAMP High / Rev 5	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	USA — CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	USA — SEC Cyber Disclosure Rules	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	USA — CMMC 2.0 Level 3	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	USA — HIPAA Security Rule	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	USA — NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	USA — Texas TX-RAMP Level 2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	USA — California CCPA / CPRA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Canada — OSFI B-13	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Canada — ITSG-33	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Mexico — INAI LFPDPPP + CNBV	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Brazil — LGPD + BACEN Res 4893	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Argentina — PDPA 25.326	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Chile — CMF NCG 454	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
16	Colombia — Habeas Data Ley 1581	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Asia-Pacific

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 16 indexed regimes in Asia-Pacific.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	Australia — Essential Eight / ISM	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	Australia — APRA CPS 234 + CPS 230	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	New Zealand — NZISM v3.7	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	Japan — METI Cyber/Physical SF + FSA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	South Korea — K-ISMS-P + ISMS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	Singapore — MAS TRM 2021 + IMDA-MTCS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Hong Kong — HKMA SA-2 + C-RAF 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	China — MLPS 2.0 (GB/T 22239)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	India — RBI Cyber Resilience MD + DPDP	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	India — CERT-In Cyber Directions 2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Indonesia — OJK 11/POJK.03/2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Malaysia — BNM RMiT + CSF 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Thailand — BoT 9/2564 + PDPA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Philippines — BSP Circular 1198	Identity · Network · Data · Detection ·

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
		Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Vietnam — Decree 53/2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Taiwan — FSC + iSAC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Middle East & Africa

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 18 indexed regimes in Middle East & Africa.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	UAE — TDRA NCSF + CBUAE	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	UAE Dubai — DESC ISR + DIFC DPL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	UAE Abu Dhabi — ADGM FSRA + ADHICS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	Saudi Arabia — SAMA CSF 1.0 + NCA ECC-1 + CCC-1	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	Qatar — QCB Cyber + NIA Policy	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	Bahrain — CBB OM + PDPL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Kuwait — CBK Cyber + DPPR	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	Oman — CBO + OCERT	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	Israel — INCD Cyber Defence Methodology 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Turkey — BDDK + ISO/IEC 27001 mandate	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Egypt — CBE 415/2023 + NTRA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	South Africa — POPIA + SARB Joint Standard 2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
		above.
13	Kenya — CBK Guidance + DPA 2019	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Nigeria — NDPR + CBN Cyber Framework	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Morocco — DGSSI + Law 09-08	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Mauritius — BoM Guide + DPA 2017	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
17	Ghana — CSA Directives	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
18	Rwanda — NCSA Cyber Reg 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Appendix E: Companion Artefacts Manifest

The doctrine ships as code. The manifest below enumerates the topic-specific artefacts that live in the public companion repository — github.com/uos-doctrine-series/paper-03-private-by-default — alongside this paper. Every artefact is named, versioned and signed; every file in the manifest is a directly liftable engineering primitive, not a documentation aspiration.

#	Companion artefact (path)	One-line description
1	README.md	Doctrine entry-point, private-link migration playbook and lift instructions.
2	/bicep/private-endpoint-modules.bicep	Library of Private Endpoint Bicep modules for 16 PaaS services.
3	/bicep/private-dns-resolver-hub.bicep	Hub Private DNS Resolver with health-checked failover pair.
4	/bicep/frontdoor-waf-strict.bicep	Front Door Premium + WAF prevention-mode + DDoS Standard egress triad.
5	/policy/deny-public-paas-policies.json	Azure Policy initiative denying publicNetworkAccess = Enabled per supported service.
6	/policy/service-endpoint-deprecation.json	Audit-then-deny initiative removing Service Endpoint usage.
7	/kql/public-endpoint-creation-hunt.kql	Sentinel KQL detecting any public PaaS endpoint creation.
8	/kql/public-dns-resolver-anomaly.kql	Detection on workload-side use of a public DNS resolver outside hub path.
9	/soar/public-endpoint-quarantine.json	Logic App SOAR playbook quarantining orphan public endpoints in < 10 min.
10	/soar/exception-expiry-quarantine.json	SOAR playbook auto-quarantining resources whose policy-exemption has expired.
11	/diagrams/private-link-topology.drawio	Reference Private Link topology (editable).
12	/diagrams/egress-triad.drawio	Front Door + WAF + DDoS Standard topology (editable).
13	/controls-mapping/nis2-dora-gdpr-cross.csv	Crosswalk of PVT-NNN controls to NIS2 / DORA / GDPR / NCSC CAF v3.2.
14	/test-cases/waf-synthetic-corpus.json	WAF regression test corpus.
15	/runbooks/private-link-migration-12m.md	12-month application Private Link migration runbook.
16	/runbooks/exception-review-monthly.md	Risk-committee monthly residual-exception review runbook.
17	/one-pagers/board-decision-pack.pdf	Board-grade decision pack.
18	/datasets/evidence-ledger.csv	Source-attribution ledger for every quantified claim.
19	LICENSE.md	Apache 2.0 with regulator-disclosure carve-out.

Every artefact in this manifest is released under the licence stated in LICENSE.md, version-tagged to match this paper edition (v3.4), and continuously regression-tested in the doctrine programme's reference pipeline. Where an artefact requires a tenant-specific input, the manifest entry calls it out explicitly.

About the Author

KIERAN UPADRASTA

Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University

PRMIA Cyber Security Programme Lead, Architect, Consultant

| Strategic Cyber Consultant | Principal AI Architect | Fractional CISO | Institutional Cyber Governance | OT Solution Architect | Board Advisor | 27+ Yrs | Big 4 (Deloitte, PwC, EY, KPMG) • 21 years Banking & Financial Services • DORA • NIS2 | ISACA Platinum (London) | (ISC)² Gold (London) | Lead Auditor — ISF Auditors and Control | Honorary Senior Lecturer — Imperials | UCL Researcher |

Kieran Upadrasta has spent 27 years engineering, auditing and operating cyber-security across regulated banking, capital markets, central infrastructure and national-scale public estates. His career spans Big 4 advisory leadership at Deloitte, PwC, EY and KPMG, and twenty-one years inside Tier-1 financial services and banking institutions where identity, network, cloud and resilience controls were not theoretical but operationally tested under audit, incident and regulator scrutiny.

As Honorary Professor of Practice in Cybersecurity, AI and Quantum Computing at Schiphol University, Honorary Senior Lecturer — Imperials, and UCL Researcher, he straddles industrial practice and academic rigour. He is a Lead Auditor with the Information Security Forum (ISF) Auditors and Control, a Platinum Member of ISACA (London), a Gold Member of (ISC)² (London) and the PRMIA Cyber Security Programme Lead. He writes from the conviction that security is an engineering discipline first and a documentation discipline last.

“Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.”