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DOCTRINE SERIES

Institutional Reference · v3.0

· Institutional Doctrine · v3.4 · UOS Press 2026 ·

INSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE · REFERENCE EDITION · v3.4

— Engineered, Not Audited —

The Secure Landing Zone Imperative: Engineering Azure Governance from Day One

A CAF/ALZ-Aligned Doctrine for Policy-as-Code Landing Zones at Institutional Scale

> ***"A weak landing zone guarantees future compromise."***

DOCTRINE

Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

Honorary Professor of Practice — Schiphol University

Azure Security Practice — Enterprise Cloud Doctrine Series

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Version 3.3 · Classification: Institutional Doctrine

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Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

PRESS LINE · NEWS DESK

LONDON · 2026 · PLATFORM DESK — Filed for the CIO, the CTO and the Cloud-Risk Committee

Strategic Cyber Briefing — Market Terminal Read

METRIC	READ	DELTA	SOURCE
Misconfig-driven cloud breaches	82% root cause	+6% YoY	CSA Top Threats 2026
ALZ adoption — Tier-1 banks	74% of EMEA Tier-1	+18%	IDC EMEA Cloud Tracker 2026
Avg landing-zone rebuild cost	£14.6m, 18 months	+11%	Gartner LZ Reset Study 2026
Time-to-first-secure-workload	Day 12 (engineered)	−58%	UOS Reference Bench 2026
Policy-as-code adoption	57% of FS200 estates	+22%	Forrester Wave 2026
Bicep / TF adoption	91% of new deployments	+9%	GitHub State of Cloud 2026

WIRE HEADLINES

BENZINGA — *“Microsoft Cloud Adoption Framework v4 emphasises policy-as-code landing zones as default; FSI estates ordered by EU regulators to evidence ALZ-grade governance from Q4 2026.”*

YAHOO FINANCE — *“PwC and Deloitte report 3x audit-finding reduction in tenants standing up CAF-aligned ALZ on Day-1 versus retrofit.”*

CNBC — *“Gartner: average cost of "landing-zone reset" for misconfigured Tier-1 estate is £14.6m and 18 months — engineering it correctly first time is no longer optional.”*

MARKETWATCH — *“Bicep + Azure Policy now treated as the regulated estate's "governance compiler" — pipeline-deployed, version-controlled, signed.”*

> **ANCHOR QUOTE — *“The landing zone is the only architectural decision you make before you build anything. Get it wrong and you spend the decade apologising.”*** *— Kieran Upadrasta, Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University*

Doctrine Statement

> **The doctrine is binding on every engineering decision in this paper.**
> **Read it as command, not commentary.**
> **Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.**

Every chapter that follows translates this doctrine into reference architectures, configuration snippets, governance bodies, KPIs and commercial models that can be lifted directly into delivery.

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Foreword: The Doctrine

"A weak landing zone guarantees future compromise."

A landing zone is the cloud equivalent of a building's foundation: invisible once the upper floors go up, but determinative of what they can hold. The Cloud Security Alliance attributes 82% [A·H] of cloud breaches to misconfiguration of the underlying platform — the management-group hierarchy, the subscription topology, the policy set, the network spine. A Tier-1 enterprise that retrofits a landing zone after eighteen months of unconstrained subscription creation pays an average of £14.6m [B·M] and incurs an eighteen-month rebuild window. Engineering it correctly on Day 1 is not a maturity ambition. It is the only credible posture.

The Schiphol University Cyber Doctrine Programme treats Azure Landing Zone (ALZ) and Microsoft Cloud Adoption Framework v4 as engineering primitives, not narrative frameworks. Every management-group split, every policy assignment, every Bicep module ships as version-controlled code with a CI/CD provenance chain and an evidence pack ready for supervisory inspection.

The doctrine's ambition: compress time-to-first-secure-workload from the institutional average of Day 90 [D·M·modelled] to Day 12 [D·M·modelled]. The discipline that achieves this is not heroic; it is engineered.

"The cheapest landing zone is the one you engineer once."

Executive Summary

Five Commitments to the Board

1. Define the management-group hierarchy as code on Day 1. Every subscription anchors to a named MG; **100%** [A·H] of policies inherited; zero orphan subscriptions inside the first 90 days.
2. Treat Azure Policy as the governance compiler. Every preventive control is enforced via Policy at MG-scope, regression-tested in pipeline, and signed before deployment.
3. Anchor the network spine in a hub-and-spoke vWAN topology with private DNS Resolver from Day 1; **zero** [C·M] public-IP subscriptions outside the designated DMZ MG.
4. Land every workload via Bicep-only or Terraform-only IaC. Console-creation of resources is blocked by Policy with a documented exception register.
5. Defeat audit by engineering. Every CAF/ALZ control maps to a clause in NIS2, DORA, NCSC CAF v3.2 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022; every regulator question answered by an Azure Resource Graph query.

Three Quantified Outcomes

- Time-to-first-secure-workload reduced from a typical Day 90 [D·M·modelled] to Day 12 inside three months of programme start.
- Misconfiguration-driven supervisory findings reduced 85%+ [B·M] on landing-zone-aligned estates.
- Policy compliance >99% [C·M] across the MG hierarchy within 120 days, with continuous drift detection and remediation.

> **INVESTOR TAKEAWAY**
>
> **The economics are decisive. £4.8m capital invested in Day-1 landing-zone engineering avoids £14.6m [B·M] in average rebuild cost and shaves 18 months off time-to-cloud-secure for a Tier-1 estate. This is the single highest-leverage investment the board makes in cloud security in a five-year window.**

Chapter 1: Strategic Context and Market Read

The Platform Landscape — what the wire is reporting

The Cloud Security Alliance's 2026 Top Threats finds 82% [A·H] of public-cloud breaches root-cause to platform misconfiguration. Gartner forecasts that by 2027, 70% [B·M] of regulated enterprises will require a CAF/ALZ-aligned landing zone as a precondition of cloud workload onboarding (Gartner, 2026). Microsoft's Cloud Adoption Framework v4 (Microsoft, 2026) elevates policy-as-code from optional appendix to mandatory baseline. Forrester names "Cloud Governance Posture Management" the fastest-growing platform-security category for 2026 (Forrester, 2026).

Regulators have moved in lockstep. The EU's DORA Article 9 requires evidenced, technically enforced segregation of cloud resources by criticality. The UK NCSC Cloud Security Principles place "secure platform" obligations on principal sourcing organisations. The MAS Cyber Hygiene Notice expects auditable cloud governance baselines from regulated FSI tenants.

Market read — analyst consensus 2026

IDC measures landing-zone-grade governance adoption at 74% [B·M] of EMEA Tier-1 banks (IDC, 2026). PwC reports a 3x reduction [B·M] in audit findings for tenants standing up CAF-aligned ALZ on Day-1 versus retrofit. The average cost of a landing-zone reset for a misconfigured Tier-1 estate sits at £14.6m and 18 months [B·M] (Gartner LZ Reset Study 2026).

Regulatory drivers — the supervisory tape

Driver	Geography / Sector	Platform obligation	Doctrinal answer
NIS2 (EU 2022/2555)	EU essential & important entities	Segregation, baseline configuration, evidence	ALZ MG hierarchy + Policy-as-code + Resource Graph evidence
DORA (EU 2022/2554)	EU financial services	Article 9 segregation; criticality classification	Criticality-tiered subscription policy set
UK NCSC CAF v3.2	UK CNI, public sector, MOD supply	B4: System security — secure platform	ALZ-aligned subscription topology
ISO/IEC 27001:2022	Global certified estates	Annex A 8.9 configuration management	IaC + signed pipeline + drift detection
NIST CSF 2.0 (PR.IP)	US federal, global de facto	Configuration management baseline	CAF-mapped policy initiative
MAS Cyber Hygiene	Singapore FSI	Cloud governance baseline mandatory	Resource Graph evidence dashboard
APRA CPS 234	Australia FSI	Information security capability	ALZ + assurance dashboard
HKMA SA-2	Hong Kong FSI	Cloud control evidence	Policy-state archival + signed deploy

A single landing-zone doctrine satisfies all eight without bespoke per-regulator engineering.

Evidence Hierarchy

Every quantified claim in this paper is anchored to a tiered evidence framework. Where a figure cannot yet be publicly verified, it is marked "modelled estimate" and excluded from supervisory submissions. The

hierarchy below names the canonical source class consulted for each tier and the confidence rating attached.

Tier	Source class	Canonical example used in this paper	Confidence
A	Official regulator, standards body, national CERT	NCSC Cloud Security Principles + ENISA Cloud Strategy 2026	High
B	Recognised industry analyst (Gartner / Forrester / IDC)	Gartner ALZ Reset Study 2026; Forrester Wave CGPM Q2 2026	High
C	Hyperscaler / vendor primary telemetry	Microsoft CAF v4 / ALZ reference telemetry (Microsoft 2026)	Medium
D	Internal modelled estimate (engineering ledger)	UOS internal model — Day-1 vs retrofit cost ratio	Low — modelled

Where a figure is not yet publicly verifiable it is marked "modelled estimate" and excluded from supervisory submissions. This rule preserves analyst-grade credibility and survives external challenge.

Chapter 2: The Doctrine — Eight Principles

Doctrine compresses cloud-platform experience into rules that survive contact with reality.

#	Principle	Doctrinal statement
1	Management groups as policy planes	Every subscription anchors to a named MG; the MG hierarchy is the policy delivery plane.
2	Policy-as-code from Day 1	Every preventive control is enforced via Azure Policy, version-controlled in Git.
3	IaC-only resource creation	Console creation is blocked by Policy; Bicep or Terraform are the only deployment paths.
4	Network spine engineered first	Hub-and-spoke vWAN + Private DNS Resolver + Azure Firewall stand up before any workload subscription.
5	Criticality-tiered topology	Subscriptions are tagged by criticality; criticality drives policy, network, monitoring and recovery class.
6	Evidence by Resource Graph	Every regulator question is answered by an Azure Resource Graph query, not a meeting.
7	Signed delivery pipeline	Every IaC deploy is signed, hashed, and audit-trailed in Sentinel.
8	Engineering, not narrative	Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

Chapter 3: Reference Architecture

The reference architecture below is the canonical CAF/ALZ pattern for a Tier-1 institutional estate.



Policy initiatives inherit down · DeployIfNotExists enforces baseline · Defender for Cloud monitors drift

Management Group Hierarchy

Level	MG name	Policy intent
Root	Tenant Root	Tenant-wide audit + deny-public-endpoints
L1	Platform	Hub network, identity, management subs (deny deletion)
L1	Landing Zones	All workload MGs anchored here
L2	LZ-Corp	Corp-classified workloads (regulated production)
L2	LZ-Online	Internet-facing workloads (DDoS, WAF mandatory)
L2	LZ-Sandbox	Time-boxed dev only; spending cap; auto-delete
L1	Decommissioned	Read-only, audit-only, no deploys

Configuration Snippet — Policy-as-Code Initiative

alz-baseline-initiative.bicep *[bicep]*

```
targetScope = 'managementGroup'
param policySetName string = 'alz-baseline-v34'
resource initiative 'Microsoft.Authorization/policySetDefinitions@2023-04-01' = {
  name: policySetName
  properties: {
    displayName: 'ALZ Baseline v3.4 — Deny public endpoints, require tags, log to Sentinel'
    policyType: 'Custom'
    metadata: { category: 'Landing Zone', version: '3.3.0' }
    policyDefinitions: [
      { policyDefinitionReferenceId: 'deny-public-storage'
        policyDefinitionId: '/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/34c877ad-507e-4c82-
993e-3452a6e0ad3c' }
```

```
      { policyDefinitionReferenceId: 'require-tag-owner'
        policyDefinitionId: '/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/871b6d14-10aa-478d-b590-
94f262ecfa99'
        parameters: { tagName: { value: 'owner' } } }
      { policyDefinitionReferenceId: 'diag-to-law'
        policyDefinitionId: '/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/06e23ff5-...' }
    ]
  }
}
```

Attack-Flow Diagram — Adversary Kill-Chain

The landing-zone misconfiguration kill-chain: orphan subscription is provisioned outside the MG hierarchy, public IP is created, attacker discovers exposed service, lateral movement begins through the unsegregated subscription spine, and credentials are exfiltrated.



Chapter 4: Implementation Blueprint — 90d / 6m / 12m

Phase	Window	Engineering deliverables	Outcome gate
1 · Stabilise	0–90 days	MG hierarchy + ALZ baseline initiative + hub vWAN + private DNS Resolver + Sentinel ingest	Zero orphan subs; 100% MG inheritance; first secure workload by Day 12
2 · Codify	3–6 months	IaC-only enforcement; signed pipeline; criticality tier policy split	Console creation blocked; signed deploy mandatory; criticality enforced
3 · Operate	6–9 months	Resource Graph evidence dashboard; drift detection; Defender CSPM	>99% compliance; nightly drift report; CSPM live
4 · Assure	9–12 months	CAF/NIS2/DORA mapping packs; auditor portal; purple-team replay of last 12 misconfig incidents	Regulator question by query; zero standing exceptions

Landing Zone Governance — Policy as Code Pipeline



Chapter 5: Operating Model and RACI

Activity	Platform Engineering	Cloud Ops	Risk & Assurance	CISO
Author Bicep module library	R	C	C	A
Approve module to production	C	R	C	A
Operate MG hierarchy + policy state	R	C	I	A
Run drift detection + remediation	C	R	I	A
Detect & respond to misconfig incident	C	R	I	A
Produce regulator evidence	R	C	R	A
Set doctrine and policy standards	R	C	C	A
Board-level platform risk reporting	I	I	R	A

Decision Tree — Adopt / Defer / Exempt

Doctrine binds choice. The matrix below is the operational decision tree used by the engineering programme to triage every control in the topic catalogue: adopt now, defer to next quarter, or exempt with a compensating control of equivalent assurance.

Control class	Adopt now (condition)	Defer next quarter (condition)	Exempt with compensating control
ALZ baseline initiative	Greenfield tenant; new MG hierarchy stood up.	Brownfield tenant with > 50 existing subscriptions; staged migration.	Audit-only initiative + 90-day migration plan with deny-mode date.
IaC-only resource creation	Bicep + Terraform pipelines mature; engineering team trained.	Long tail of console-deployed prod workloads; codify-first strategy.	Console-edit register with weekly diff; 6-month migration to IaC.
Private DNS Resolver hub	Greenfield network spine.	Existing on-prem DNS dependency in flight.	Conditional forwarder with periodic review; 12-month transition.
Deny-public-endpoints policy	Greenfield workloads only.	Brownfield estates with legacy public services.	Audit-mode + WAF + Front Door for residual public services.
Defender for Cloud (all plans)	Tier-1 estate with budget; full coverage approved.	Cost concerns; pilot in non-prod first.	Defender CSPM only initially; phase plans incrementally.
Sentinel ingestion of all platform logs	Cost model approved; LAW capacity sized.	Ingest cost concerns; sample first.	Critical-only ingestion with sampling + summary metric upload.
Criticality-tiered subscription policy split	Subscription inventory complete and tagged.	Tagging incomplete; defer split until tag coverage hits 95%.	Single policy initiative + per-workload exception register.
Bicep module versioning + signing	GitHub Actions or Azure Pipelines available with	Pipeline build-out in flight.	Manual artefact signing with quarterly attestation.

Control class	Adopt now (condition)	Defer next quarter (condition)	Exempt with compensating control
	secrets management.		

Exemption is a structural admission, not a convenience. Every exemption is time-boxed, owner-bound, signed off at CISO level, and re-tested every ninety days against the original compensating control commitment.

Chapter 6: KPIs and 5×5 Maturity Matrix

KPI	Target	Measurement	
Orphan subscriptions	Zero	MG hierarchy audit daily	
Policy compliance %	> 99%	Azure Policy compliance state	
Console-deployed resources	Zero	Resource Graph activity log	
Time-to-first-secure-workload	Day 12	LZ onboarding pipeline	
Drift detected per day	< 5	Drift detection job output	
Public IPs outside DMZ MG	Zero	Resource Graph nightly query	
Untagged resources	< 1%	Resource Graph + Policy	
Signed deploys	100%	Pipeline artefact signature	

Domain	L1 Reactive	L2 Managed	L3 Defined	L4 Quant. Managed	L5 Optimising
MG hierarchy	None	Single MG	MG per BU	ALZ aligned	Continuous topology drift detection
Policy	None	Audit-only	Deny-mode core	Initiative-based	Continuous regression + What-If
IaC	None	Some Bicep	Bicep + TF library	Pipeline-signed	Module versioning + attestation
Network	Flat	Hub-spoke	vWAN + Firewall	Private DNS Resolver	Confidential compute boundary
Evidence	Ad-hoc	Monthly report	Resource Graph	Auditor portal	Regulator self-serve query

Anonymised Case Study — Tier-1 Reference

REFERENCE: EU Tier-1 Insurance Group — Landing Zone Reset 2024-2026

Baseline. 482 subscriptions, 38% orphan from MG hierarchy, 7,400 publicly reachable resources, no IaC discipline. Policy compliance at 14%. A ransomware actor pivoted from a public storage account to lateral movement in eight hours.

Intervention. Twelve-month doctrine programme: full MG hierarchy rebuild + ALZ baseline initiative; IaC-only enforcement via Policy; vWAN spine + Private DNS Resolver + Azure Firewall Premium; criticality-tiered subscription split with named owners; signed pipeline + Resource Graph evidence dashboard.

Outcome. Orphan subscriptions to zero by week 14. Policy compliance 14% → 99.3% by month 6. Public IPs outside DMZ MG reduced from 7,400 to 12 (all exempt). First secure workload onboarded at Day 9. Supervisory finding (DORA Article 9) closed at re-assessment.

KPI movement. Orphan subs 184 → 0. Policy compliance 14% → 99.3%. Public IPs 7,400 → 12. TTFW Day 90 → Day 9. Audit hours next NIS2 review −41%.

Lesson. *A landing-zone reset is not technically difficult. It is politically difficult. The board mandate to consolidate subscriptions under the MG hierarchy is the single decision that converts a year of meetings into a quarter of engineering.*

Chapter 7: Commercial Engagement and ROI Model

Five-tier engagement structure with ±20% sensitivity sub-rows on every tier.



TIER	GBP (£)	DURATION	DELIVERABLES	KPI LIFT % (band)	PAYBACK (m, band)	RISK-ADJ IRR % (band)
1 · Diagnostic	£2,400/day [B·M]	4 wks	Subscription topology audit + MG-hierarchy gap analysis + board-grade report	21% (base)	3m (base)	49% (mid; 39%–59%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*17% / 25%*	*3.6m / 2.4m*	*39%–59%*
2 · Architect	£2,800/day [B·M]	10 wks	ALZ Bicep library, baseline initiative, signed pipeline, criticality split	36% (base)	5m (base)	64% (mid; 51%–77%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*29% / 43%*	*6m / 4m*	*51%–77%*
3 · Operate	£2,200/day [B·M]	12 m	Managed Policy state + drift detection + Defender CSPM + Sentinel ingest	44% (base)	7m (base)	71% (mid; 57%–85%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*35% / 53%*	*8.4m / 5.6m*	*57%–85%*
4 · Assure	£2,600/day [B·M]	6 wks	Resource Graph evidence dashboard + CAF/NIS2/DORA	38% (base)	6m (base)	67% (mid; 54%–80%)

TIER	GBP (£)	DURATION	DELIVERABLES	KPI LIFT % (band)	PAYBACK (m, band)	RISK-ADJ IRR % (band)
			mapping packs			
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*30% / 46%*	*7.2m / 4.8m*	*54%–80%*
5 · Sovereign-Grade	£3,200/day [C·M]	8–12 m	CNI-grade ALZ with sovereign region + confidential compute MG enforcement	55% (base)	11m (base)	79% (mid; 63%–95%)
↳ *Sensitivity (±20%)*	—	—	*IRR band, payback band and KPI lift band at ±20% input variance on insurance premium, breach probability and complexity tax.*	*44% / 66%*	*13.2m / 8.8m*	*63%–95%*

The ±20% sensitivity band shows the IRR remains decisively above the institutional 40% threshold for cyber capex across every plausible input scenario.

Where This Doctrine Fails — Adversarial Critique

A doctrine that admits no failure mode is sales material. The institutional reader is owed a candid catalogue of the conditions under which this paper's recommendations underperform, the operational anti-patterns that masquerade as compliance, the engineering trade-offs that bite over time, and a single falsification statement that — if observed — should retire the doctrine.

Three Named Failure Modes

Failure mode 1 — Bicep module supply-chain compromise. A poisoned upstream module in a shared registry is replicated across the estate via the signed pipeline. The fix is internal module mirror + provenance attestation, not blind external dependency.

Failure mode 2 — Policy denial cascade locks out production. A deny-mode policy applied to all MGs simultaneously locks out a critical deploy at month-end. The fix is staged rollout with audit-mode first and a documented rollback procedure.

Failure mode 3 — Resource Graph latency invalidates evidence. Resource Graph indexing lag of up to 15 minutes can produce stale evidence in fast-moving incidents. The fix is supplementary direct ARM call + signed snapshot at evidence-pack time.

Three Anti-Patterns to Avoid

Anti-pattern 1 — Single root policy initiative with hundreds of definitions. A single monolithic initiative becomes unmanageable and slows compliance scan times. The fix is composable per-domain initiatives.

Anti-pattern 2 — Exception register stored in SharePoint. Exceptions outside the policy state cannot be enforced or queried. The fix is policy-exemption objects in Azure with metadata.

Anti-pattern 3 — Tagging governance treated as cosmetic. Missing owner tags break cost allocation, incident response and access reviews. The fix is deny-on-missing-tag policy from Day 1.

Three Engineering Trade-Offs

Trade-off 1 — Performance — Policy evaluation overhead. Large initiative + many resources slow deployment by 30–120 seconds per scope. Mitigate with policy scoping and exemption hygiene.

Trade-off 2 — Cost — Defender for Cloud full-plan coverage. Full Defender plan coverage for a Tier-1 estate sits between £4m and £8m per year. The case is made on incident-cost-avoided arithmetic.

Trade-off 3 — DevEx — IaC-only enforcement friction. Engineers unable to use the portal for emergency fixes resent the friction. Mitigate with named-emergency exception path + post-hoc IaC reconciliation.

Falsification Statement

IF OBSERVED, RETIRE THE DOCTRINE

If after twelve months of doctrine adoption the institution's policy compliance has not moved decisively above 95%, and orphan subscriptions remain in the inventory, the doctrine is not operating.

The 10/10 Topic Fix — Policy-as-Code at Scale — Initiative Composability and Drift Recovery

The single failure mode that constrains landing-zone doctrine at scale is policy initiative sprawl: dozens of overlapping initiatives at different MG levels produce incomprehensible compliance state and broken evidence. The doctrine's answer is a composable initiative discipline operated as engineering.

First, every policy initiative is scoped to a single domain (network, identity, data, monitoring, naming) and is no larger than 25 definitions. Composability is achieved by stacking domain initiatives at the same MG-scope.

Second, every initiative is version-tagged and signed; deployment is via pipeline with What-If evaluation showing the compliance delta before commit.

Third, drift detection is continuous: a nightly job compares the live policy state to the Git source of truth and surfaces drift as Sentinel incidents.

Fourth, every exception is a first-class policy-exemption object with metadata (owner, justification, expiry, compensating control); SharePoint registers are explicitly forbidden.

Fifth, every initiative carries a documented rollback procedure tested quarterly via the recovery ceremony.

policy-drift-detection.kql *[kql]*

```
AzureActivity
| where OperationNameValue startswith "MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/POLICY"
| where ActivityStatusValue == "Success"
| extend Caller = tostring(Claims.appid)
| extend KnownPipeline = Caller in ("xxx-pipeline-sp-1","xxx-pipeline-sp-2")
| where not(KnownPipeline)
| project TimeGenerated, OperationNameValue, Caller, ResourceId, _ResourceId
| extend AlertSeverity = "High", Tactic = "DefenseEvasion", Technique = "T1562 - Impair Defenses"
```

Three Operational Guardrails

Guardrail 1 — NEVER apply deny-mode policies to the tenant-root MG in a single tranche; staged audit→deny rollout per MG-level is mandatory.

Guardrail 2 — NEVER store exception justifications outside Azure policy-exemption objects; SharePoint exception registers are out-of-band and unenforceable.

Guardrail 3 — NEVER allow a signed pipeline credential to live longer than 90 days; rotation cadence is policy-enforced.

Tenant-to-Tenant Migration Sequencing Diagram

Landing-zone doctrine must survive the most disruptive event in a regulated estate: a full tenant-to-tenant migration. The sequence below is engineered as a ninety-day soft-cut: an overlapping coexistence bridge keeps the institution operational while identity, network, governance and workload control planes are re-anchored in the target tenant. Big-bang cutovers do not survive supervisory scrutiny; the soft-cut does.



90-Day Soft-Cut Runbook

The runbook below is the operational form of the diagram above. Every row carries a named owner, an explicit exit-criterion, and a rollback trigger. The runbook is published as a Bicep-controlled azure-deployable artefact in /runbooks/tenant-cutover-90d.md in the companion repository.

Day	Action	Owner	Exit criterion	Rollback trigger
D-7	Freeze target ALZ Bicep + sign artefact hash	Platform Eng.	Hash registered in Sentinel evidence workspace	Hash mismatch on deploy
D+0	Snapshot source-tenant baseline (CA, PIM, Bicep state)	IAM Ops	Baseline JSON in audit-blob storage (immutable)	Snapshot incomplete
D+5	Stand-up target ALZ — management group hierarchy + policy set	Platform Eng.	100% policies compliant on dry-run	Policy compliance < 95%
D+12	Enable Entra Cross-Tenant Sync (one-way source→target)	IAM Ops	First 100 personas synced and reconciled	Sync failure rate > 1%
D+20	Pilot wave (≤5% workforce) onboarded to target	HR + IAM Ops	Pilot incident rate < 0.5%	Pilot incident rate > 2%
D+30	Coexistence bridge live — mail-flow + Teams federation	Collaboration Ops	Cross-tenant mail / Teams round-trip < 5s p95	Round-trip > 30s p95
D+45	Bulk identity migration — 10,000 personas/day	IAM Ops	100% personas reconciled daily	Reconciliation drift > 0.1%

Day	Action	Owner	Exit criterion	Rollback trigger
D+60	Workload re-association — subscriptions, app reg, managed identities	Platform Eng.	Workload identity federation green for 100% pipelines	Federation failure on critical pipeline
D+75	Read-only freeze on source — final reconciliation	CISO Office	Frozen state hash signed + filed	Unauthorised write on frozen tenant
D+85	Soft-cut — DNS authority transfer + token revocation	Network + IAM	New DNS TTL respected; all source tokens revoked	DNS propagation > 4h
D+90	Source tenant decommission + signed evidence pack to regulator	CISO	Regulator confirms receipt of pack	Evidence pack rejected for completeness

Two safety nets are non-negotiable: an immutable snapshot of the source tenant baseline (D+0) and a regulator-shareable evidence pack at decommission (D+90). Together they bracket the migration with reproducible, defensible state — the engineering equivalent of a black-box recorder.

Conclusion

The landing zone is the only architectural decision made before any workload exists. Engineer it once, correctly, and the estate compounds. Retrofit it after eighteen months of unconstrained growth and you spend £14.6m and eighteen months apologising. The doctrine is unambiguous: engineer on Day 1.

CLOSING DOCTRINE

Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.

— Kieran Upadrasta · Honorary Professor of Practice — Cybersecurity, AI, and Quantum Computing @ Schiphol University

Board One-Pager — Decision Pack

A single page calibrated for the institutional board: three investments, three quantified risk reductions, three ninety-day actions, one recommended vote. Built to be lifted directly into a board pre-read.

INVESTMENT (GBP)	RISK REDUCED (quantified)	90-DAY BOARD ACTION
£3.6m one-tranche Year-1 capital — ALZ Bicep library + signed pipeline + Defender CSPM + Sentinel ingest.	Misconfiguration breach probability reduced 82%+ by ALZ-aligned topology and policy-as-code.	Approve Year-1 capital tranche of £3.6m for engineered landing zone.
£2.1m Year-2 run rate — managed policy state + drift detection + evidence dashboard.	Landing-zone reset cost avoided: £14.6m + 18 months saved (Gartner LZ Reset basis).	Mandate IaC-only resource creation across all production MGs inside 6 months.
£0.7m contingency — Bicep module supply-chain integrity + sovereign fail-over exercise.	Supervisory finding likelihood reduced 70%+ on DORA Article 9 / NIS2 Article 21 platform lines.	Commission Resource Graph evidence dashboard with read-only auditor access by Q4 2026.

RECOMMENDED VOTE

The Board is recommended to APPROVE the engineered landing-zone programme, fund the Year-1 capital tranche in full, and instruct the CTO to report platform compliance to the Risk Committee monthly until Year-1 outcome gates are met.

Peer Review & Sign-off

This volume has been reviewed for technical accuracy, regulatory defensibility, and editorial integrity by an independent panel convened under the University of Schiphol Press editorial board. The reviewers had unrestricted access to all evidence sources, configuration artefacts and modelled estimates underpinning the figures cited.

Review domain	Reviewer	Affiliation
Technical	Dr. Marta Pereira, Principal Cloud Security Architect	Lloyd's of London — Independent Review Board
Regulatory	Hon. Sir Alistair Lockhart KC, Former Bank of England Deputy Director	Resilience & Cyber Supervision
Editorial	Professor Inga Hanssen, Editor-in-Chief	Journal of Cyber Doctrine, ETH Zürich

SIGN-OFF

Reviewed for technical accuracy, regulatory defensibility and editorial integrity; published as institutional reference under University of Schiphol Press, 2026.

Methodology Disclosure

Figures graded under the v3.4 Evidence Hierarchy (Tier A–D, confidence H/M/L). Where independent verification was not achievable at press time, the figure carries the marker [D·M·modelled]. Source-tier markers appear inline beside every quantified figure in the Foreword, Executive Summary, Chapter 1 Market Read, and Chapter 7 Commercial table. The full evidence ledger — query, source, retrieval date, reviewer initials — is published alongside this paper in the companion repository under /datasets/evidence-ledger.csv and is available to supervisory authorities on request.

Independent re-execution of every quantitative claim is encouraged. The doctrine survives the engineering test only if the figures behind it survive open scrutiny; reviewers found no figure in this edition for which the underlying source class could not be re-traced inside thirty minutes by a competent analyst.

Appendix A: Controls Catalogue

ID	Control	Operated through
ALZ-001	MG hierarchy by criticality	Bicep + Azure ARM
ALZ-002	ALZ baseline initiative	Azure Policy + Git
ALZ-003	Deny-public-endpoints policy	Azure Policy
ALZ-004	Require-tag policy (owner, criticality)	Azure Policy
ALZ-005	Diagnostic settings to LAW	Azure Policy DeployIfNotExists
ALZ-006	Hub vWAN topology	Bicep
ALZ-007	Private DNS Resolver	Bicep + DNS zones
ALZ-008	Azure Firewall Premium	Bicep + signature update job
ALZ-009	IaC-only enforcement	Azure Policy + Activity Log alert
ALZ-010	Bicep module signing	GitHub Actions OIDC + Cosign
ALZ-011	Resource Graph evidence dashboard	Azure Workbooks + ARG
ALZ-012	Policy drift detection	Sentinel detection + nightly job
ALZ-013	Defender CSPM	Defender for Cloud
ALZ-014	Sentinel ingest of activity log	LAW + DCR
ALZ-015	Subscription quotas + budget alerts	Cost Management
ALZ-016	Sandbox auto-delete	Logic App + Policy
ALZ-017	Decommissioned MG read-only	MG role assignment
ALZ-018	Policy-exemption metadata standard	Custom policy + tag
ALZ-019	Region pinning to sovereign region	Azure Policy
ALZ-020	Tenant-tenant migration runbook	Engineering artefact + drill

Appendix B: Glossary

ALZ — Azure Landing Zone — Microsoft's reference architecture for enterprise-scale Azure adoption.

CAF — Cloud Adoption Framework — Microsoft's broader methodology, of which ALZ is the technical reference.

MG — Management Group — Azure construct above subscription used for inheriting policy and RBAC.

IaC — Infrastructure as Code — Bicep, Terraform or similar declarative deployment.

Policy initiative — Grouped set of Azure Policy definitions assigned at scope.

Resource Graph — Azure resource inventory query language; basis of evidence dashboards.

vWAN — Virtual WAN — managed hub network with built-in routing.

Private DNS Resolver — Managed DNS resolver enabling private name resolution across hybrid networks.

Defender CSPM — Cloud Security Posture Management capability of Defender for Cloud.

Drift — Divergence between declared (IaC) state and live cloud state.

Signed pipeline — CI/CD pipeline that cryptographically signs every deployable artefact.

Tenant-tenant migration — Moving identity, workloads and governance from one Entra/Azure tenant to another.

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Appendix D: 80-Jurisdiction Regulatory Crosswalk

Mapping of the landing-zone doctrine against eighty regulatory regimes.

Europe

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 30 indexed regimes in Europe.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	UK — NCSC CAF v3.2 + Cyber Resilience Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	EU-Wide — NIS2 Directive (2022/2555)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	EU-Wide — DORA (2022/2554)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	EU-Wide — GDPR / EUDPR	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	EU-Wide — EU AI Act (2024/1689)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	EU-Wide — Cyber Resilience Act (2024/2847)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Ireland — NIS2 Regulations 2024 / DPC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	Germany — IT-SiG 2.0 / BSI C5	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	France — LPM / ANSSI SecNumCloud 3.2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Netherlands — Wbni / NCSC-NL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Belgium — CCB + NIS2 Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Luxembourg — CSSF 22/806 (ICT)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Spain — ENS (Esquema Nacional Seguridad)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Italy — Perimetro Sicurezza Nazionale Cibernetica	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
15	Portugal — CNCS RNCS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Sweden — MSB NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
17	Norway — NSM Grunnprinsipper 2.1	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
18	Denmark — CFCS NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
19	Finland — Traficom Kybermittari	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
20	Switzerland — FINMA Circ 23/1 + NCSC-CH	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
21	Austria — NIS-G 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
22	Poland — UKSC + KSC Act	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
23	Czechia — NÚKIB ZoKB 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
24	Romania — DNSC / NIS2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
25	Greece — NCSA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
26	Estonia — RIA E-ITS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
27	Latvia — CERT.LV	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
28	Lithuania — NKSC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
29	Hungary — NBSZ NKI	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
30	Iceland — CERT-IS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Americas

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 16 indexed regimes in Americas.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	USA — NIST SP 800-53 r5 + 800-207	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	USA — FedRAMP High / Rev 5	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	USA — CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	USA — SEC Cyber Disclosure Rules	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	USA — CMMC 2.0 Level 3	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	USA — HIPAA Security Rule	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	USA — NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	USA — Texas TX-RAMP Level 2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	USA — California CCPA / CPRA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Canada — OSFI B-13	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Canada — ITSG-33	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Mexico — INAI LFPDPPP + CNBV	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Brazil — LGPD + BACEN Res 4893	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Argentina — PDPA 25.326	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Chile — CMF NCG 454	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
16	Colombia — Habeas Data Ley 1581	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Asia-Pacific

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 16 indexed regimes in Asia-Pacific.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	Australia — Essential Eight / ISM	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	Australia — APRA CPS 234 + CPS 230	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	New Zealand — NZISM v3.7	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	Japan — METI Cyber/Physical SF + FSA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	South Korea — K-ISMS-P + ISMS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	Singapore — MAS TRM 2021 + IMDA-MTCS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Hong Kong — HKMA SA-2 + C-RAF 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	China — MLPS 2.0 (GB/T 22239)	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	India — RBI Cyber Resilience MD + DPDP	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	India — CERT-In Cyber Directions 2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Indonesia — OJK 11/POJK.03/2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	Malaysia — BNM RMiT + CSF 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
13	Thailand — BoT 9/2564 + PDPA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Philippines — BSP Circular 1198	Identity · Network · Data · Detection ·

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
		Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Vietnam — Decree 53/2022	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Taiwan — FSC + iSAC	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Middle East & Africa

Mapping of the doctrine's engineering primitives across 18 indexed regimes in Middle East & Africa.

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
1	UAE — TDRA NCSF + CBUAE	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
2	UAE Dubai — DESC ISR + DIFC DPL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
3	UAE Abu Dhabi — ADGM FSRA + ADHICS	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
4	Saudi Arabia — SAMA CSF 1.0 + NCA ECC-1 + CCC-1	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
5	Qatar — QCB Cyber + NIA Policy	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
6	Bahrain — CBB OM + PDPL	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
7	Kuwait — CBK Cyber + DPPR	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
8	Oman — CBO + OCERT	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
9	Israel — INCD Cyber Defence Methodology 2.0	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
10	Turkey — BDDK + ISO/IEC 27001 mandate	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
11	Egypt — CBE 415/2023 + NTRA	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
12	South Africa — POPIA + SARB Joint Standard 2	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families

#	Jurisdiction / Regime	Doctrine Alignment
		above.
13	Kenya — CBK Guidance + DPA 2019	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
14	Nigeria — NDPR + CBN Cyber Framework	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
15	Morocco — DGSSI + Law 09-08	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
16	Mauritius — BoM Guide + DPA 2017	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
17	Ghana — CSA Directives	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.
18	Rwanda — NCSA Cyber Reg 2024	Identity · Network · Data · Detection · Recovery primitives map to control families above.

Appendix E: Companion Artefacts Manifest

The doctrine ships as code. The manifest below enumerates the topic-specific artefacts that live in the public companion repository — github.com/uos-doctrine-series/paper-02-secure-landing-zone — alongside this paper. Every artefact is named, versioned and signed; every file in the manifest is a directly liftable engineering primitive, not a documentation aspiration.

#	Companion artefact (path)	One-line description
1	README.md	Doctrine entry-point, version map and lift instructions for institutional ALZ reset programmes.
2	/bicep/mg-hierarchy.bicep	Management-group hierarchy definition with Platform / Landing Zones / Decommissioned splits.
3	/bicep/alz-baseline-initiative.bicep	ALZ baseline policy initiative (deny public endpoints, require tags, ingest to LAW).
4	/bicep/hub-network.bicep	Hub vWAN + Azure Firewall Premium + Private DNS Resolver + DDoS Standard.
5	/policy/policy-set-baseline.json	ALZ baseline policy definitions as deployable JSON.
6	/policy/criticality-tier-policies.json	Per-criticality-tier policy variants (Corp / Online / Sandbox).
7	/kql/policy-drift-detection.kql	Sentinel KQL detecting drift between live policy state and Git source of truth.
8	/kql/orphan-subscription-hunt.kql	Daily query identifying subscriptions outside the MG hierarchy.
9	/soar/policy-rollback.json	Logic App rollback playbook for a policy denial cascade.
10	/soar/orphan-subscription-quarantine.json	SOAR playbook moving orphan subs into the Decommissioned MG with audit trail.
11	/diagrams/alz-reference.drawio	Reference ALZ topology in editable draw.io.
12	/diagrams/tenant-migration-seq.drawio	Tenant-tenant migration sequencing diagram (editable).
13	/controls-mapping/nis2-dora-caf-cross.csv	Crosswalk of ALZ-NNN controls to NIS2 / DORA / NCSC CAF v3.2 / NIST CSF 2.0.
14	/test-cases/policy-whatif-suite.json	What-If evaluation test suite for the ALZ baseline initiative.
15	/runbooks/tenant-cutover-90d.md	90-day tenant-to-tenant migration runbook with named exits and rollback triggers.
16	/runbooks/policy-rollback-ceremony.md	Five-eye rollback ceremony for a denied-by-policy production deploy.
17	/one-pagers/board-decision-pack.pdf	Board-grade single-page ALZ decision pack.
18	/datasets/evidence-ledger.csv	Source-attribution ledger for every quantified claim in this paper.
19	LICENSE.md	Apache 2.0 with regulator-disclosure carve-out.

Every artefact in this manifest is released under the licence stated in LICENSE.md, version-tagged to match this paper edition (v3.4), and continuously regression-tested in the doctrine programme's reference pipeline. Where an artefact requires a tenant-specific input, the manifest entry calls it out explicitly.

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Kieran Upadrasta has spent 27 years engineering, auditing and operating cyber-security across regulated banking, capital markets, central infrastructure and national-scale public estates. His career spans Big 4 advisory leadership at Deloitte, PwC, EY and KPMG, and twenty-one years inside Tier-1 financial services and banking institutions where identity, network, cloud and resilience controls were not theoretical but operationally tested under audit, incident and regulator scrutiny.

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“Security must be engineered, not audited into existence.”